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Abstract
This paper provides a policymaker's perspective on some lessons from the recent ¯nancial
crisis. It focuses on questions in three areas. First, what lessons can be drawn regarding
the institutional framework for monetary policy? Has the experience changed the pre-crisis
consensus that monetary policy is best performed by an independent central bank focused on
achieving and maintaining price stability? Second, what lessons can be drawn regarding the
monetary policy strategy that should be followed by a central bank? How activist should a
central bank be in dampening macroeconomic °uctuations? Should the \output gap" serve
as an important policy guide? Are there lessons regarding the stability-oriented approach
followed by the ECB? How activist should a central bank be in tackling perceived asset price
misalignments? Does the ECB's monetary analysis pillar help incorporate the pertinent
information in formulating policy? Third, is monetary policy pursuing price stability enough
to ensure overall stability in the economy? Or is there room for improvement regarding how
central banks can contribute to ¯nancial stability? Should the role of monetary policy be
seen as completely separate from the broader institutional environment governing ¯nancial
markets and institutions in our economy? Or would greater central bank involvement in
regulation and supervision pertaining to credit and ¯nance allow better management of
overall economic stability?
Keywords: Great ¯nancial crisis, activist stabilisation policy, real-time output gap, robust
simple rules, stability-oriented monetary policy, asset prices, macro-prudential supervision,
¯nancial stability, ECB.
JEL Classi¯cation: E50, E52, E58.
¤Prepared for The great ¯nancial crisis: lessons for ¯nancial stability and monetary policy: collo-
quium in honour of Lucas D. Papademos, Frankfurt, 20-21 May 2010. I would like to thank Gregory
Hess, Lucrezia Reichlin and George Tavlas, for helpful comments and suggestions. The opinions
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily re°ect views of the Governing Council of
the European Central Bank.1 Introduction
The assignment I accepted for this paper is not straightforward. The task is to provide
a policymaker's perspective on some lessons from the great ¯nancial crisis for monetary
policy. Having studied earlier challenging episodes in monetary history, I am well aware
of the pitfalls of attempting to draw lessons from a crisis while the experience is still raw.
Better to wait a decade or more, to have time to evaluate with greater clarity whether, how
and under what conditions things could have evolved di®erently. On the other hand, there
is no time to waste on suggested improvements in the policy framework if the objective is
to improve the odds of better outcomes for the future. What better opportunity to o®er
some early thoughts on the lessons, then, than the occasion presented by this colloquium
honouring Lucas Papademos, taking place right after the last meeting of the Governing
Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), before the end of his tenure as Vice-President
of this institution.
I focus on questions in three areas. First, what lessons can be drawn regarding the
institutional framework for monetary policy? Has the experience changed the pre-crisis
consensus that monetary policy is best performed by an independent central bank focused
on achieving and maintaining price stability? Should central banks be more or less inde-
pendent? Should their aim be higher in°ation instead of price stability, as some suggest?
Second, what lessons can be drawn regarding the monetary policy strategy that should
be followed by a central bank? A perennial debate in monetary economics has raged over
how ambitious monetary policy should be, how activist it should be in dampening °uc-
tuations and tackling perceived disequilibria and imbalances. Where does the historical
behaviour place the ECB in this debate? In the history of central banking, one can identify
shifts in the consensus from waves of optimism that policies could be ¯ned-tuned to achieve
more to waves of caution when the limits of our knowledge are recon¯rmed by reality. Has
the recent experience shifted the centre of gravity in this continuing debate?
Third, is monetary policy pursuing price stability enough to ensure overall stability in
the economy? Or is there room for improvement regarding how central banks can contribute
1to greater stability? Would greater central bank involvement in regulation and supervision
pertaining to credit and ¯nance allow better management of overall economic stability?
Or should the role of monetary policy be seen as completely separate from the broader
institutional environment governing ¯nancial markets and institutions in our economy?
It is not necessary to elaborate on the consequences of what became \the great ¯nancial
crisis". Its severity is evident in the evolution of euro area real GDP (Figure 1). Su±ces to
note that the level of real GDP fell by nearly 5 percent from its peak in 2008Q1 to its trough
in 2009Q2. Events during the crisis, the decisive policy responses, and implications for the
future of macro-prudential supervision, were analysed by Lucas Papademos in a number of
timely and insightful speeches (Papademos, 2007, 2008, 2009a,b,c,d, 2010). As the person
responsible for both ¯nancial stability and economic research at the ECB during the crisis,
Lucas has been in a unique position to provide insights into the events and guidance on the
appropriate policy responses.
2 The Institutional Framework of Monetary Policy
The founders of the European Union ensured that the ECB, more than any other central
bank that has ever existed, would be an independent institution fully committed to ensuring
price stability.
The independence of the ECB as well as its clear mandate are enshrined in the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union. According to the Treaty, the primary objective
of the ECB \shall be to maintain price stability". In light of this mandate, the Governing
Council of the ECB aims to maintain in°ation rates at levels below, but close to, 2 percent
over the medium term. In°ation is measured by the year-on-year rate of increase in the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).
It should not be necessary to remind ourselves why price stability is so important. The
economic costs of in°ation are well known.1 High and variable in°ation is detrimental
to productivity and growth; uncertainty and unpredictability about future prices leads to
1See, e.g. Fischer and Modigliani (1978) and Fischer (1981, 1984). See also Papademos (2001) for a more
recent ECB perspective.
2ine±cient decisions. The social costs of failing to preserve price stability can be far reaching.
In°ation is one of the most virulent and corrosive forces in a democratic society, eroding
the functioning of a market economy.
The key to securing price stability is to ensure that businesses and households do not
need to worry about protecting themselves from the in°ationary disease. Temporary up-
ward and downward °uctuations in in°ation may occur but they must not be embedded
permanently in high in°ation or de°ation. This result is assured only when in°ation expec-
tations over suitably long horizons are well anchored at levels of in°ation su±ciently low
to constitute e®ective price stability. The ECB's de¯nition of price stability, that is a rate
of increase of the HICP close but below 2 percent a year, meets this criterion. Delivering
on this goal of price stability is the best way monetary policy can contribute to economic
welfare over time.
Since the birth of the euro, the ECB has been successful in delivering on this task.
Figure 2 plots HICP in°ation as well as the long-term expectations regarding in°ation
from the ECB's quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).2 As can be seen, the
average of the SPF responses (the blue dashed line) has consistently been in line with the
ECB's price stability mandate despite °uctuations in actual in°ation which, over the past
three years, have been relatively large. There are di®erences of opinion among the survey
respondents that are also informative. The thin red lines in the ¯gure show the 25th and
75th percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution of responses in each quarter. As can
be seen by the fairly narrow width of the shaded area, disagreement, as measured by the
interquartile range of responses, has been limited. This speaks volumes for the credibility
of the ECB.
But price stability cannot be assured by a central bank unless it enjoys absolute political
independence that can be used to shield it from short-sighted political in°ationary pressures
that harm the common good over the long haul. The temptations are asymmetric and well
known. In°ationary policies can temporarily ease budgetary pressures, buying time for
2The survey has been conducted towards the end of the ¯rst month of every quarter since 1999. Its
results are published in the ECB Monthly Bulletin of the second month of each quarter.
3pro°igate governments. Necessary adjustments may be delayed. A democratically elected
government facing an unfriendly electorate, could be tempted to pursue in°ationary policies
that might temporarily raise employment and income and its electoral prospects. The
detrimental e®ects of in°ation, which far exceed any temporary gains for society, would
only appear later on. An unavoidable social cost of a democratic society is that the damage
from irresponsible government policies sometimes can be hidden from the electorate until
after the next election.
The problem, and its obvious solution, have been recognised for a very long time. Early
in the 19th century, English economist and member of Parliament David Ricardo explained
the main concern that led him to the conclusion that a central bank responsible for the
issuance of paper money should be independent as follows:
\It is said that Government could not be safely entrusted with the power of
issuing paper money; that it would most certainly abuse it; and that, on any
occasion when it was pressed for money to carry on a war, it would cease to
pay coin, on demand, for its notes; and from that moment the currency would
become a forced Government paper. There would, I confess, be great dangers
of this, if Government|that is to say, the Ministers|were themselves to be
entrusted with the power of issuing paper money" (Ricardo, 1824).
Ricardo thought it critical for the bank to be governed by individuals who, in his words,
would be \entirely independent" of the government's ministers and stressed that the indi-
viduals governing the bank \should never, on any pretence, lend money to Government, nor
be in the slightest degree under its control or in°uence." The object of Ricardo's inquiry
was the Bank of England, but his analysis has had lasting appeal and was adopted when the
ECB was created. By the end of the twentieth century, the need for an independent central
bank to ensure price stability became the consensus view. Increasingly, independence was
granted to more and more central banks (including the Bank of England in 1997). Today
virtually all of the world's major central banks enjoy a substantial degree of independence.
The credibility that an independent central bank can establish with its actions over time
4does not only facilitate the success of monetary policy in normal times. It can be invaluable
during critical times when unusual actions may be required that might otherwise risk raising
questions regarding the central bank's continued commitment to price stability.
A complicating factor, especially since the last quarter of 2008, has been that numerous
central banks around the world, including the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of
England, have reduced interest rates to or near historical lows and, as a result, consider-
ations regarding the zero bound on nominal interest rates have become pertinent. When
policy operates very close to the zero bound, unconventional policy measures may be under-
taken for engineering additional monetary policy easing.3 These measures operate through
expanding or changing the composition of the balance sheet of the central bank. At times,
monetary policy and ¯scal policy may blur as some monetary policy decisions may unavoid-
ably have a temporary ¯scal dimension.4 Under such circumstances, an independent central
bank that is credibly committed to ensuring that in°ation remains low in line with price
stability, can have much greater °exibility to take actions that would otherwise risk stoking
in°ationary fears.
Events during the past three years have provided practical demonstrations of these
points. One example has been the massive provision of liquidity by the ECB and other
central banks, ¯rst when money markets malfunctioned in August 2007 and then during
subsequent periods of stress. Were it not for the independence of the central banks in
question, and the credibility earned by their earlier success in maintaining price stability,
the ensuing rapid increases in the monetary base could have raised the spectre of in°ation
in the public's conscience.
Some purchases of assets by central banks over the past two years may also be seen
as examples of such unusual actions. These actions were taken either to repair market
functioning or, in light of the zero bound, to engineer further monetary policy easing and
defend against de°ation, or both. In the United States, for example, the Federal Reserve
3See Bernanke et al (2002), Clouse et al (2000), and Yates (2002) for reviews of unconventional tools
available to a central bank at the zero bound and Curdia and Woodford (2010) and Gertler and Karadi
(2010) for recent equilibrium models.
4See Goodfriend (2010).
5bought large quantities of asset-backed securities to prop up an ailing ¯nancial sector and
the housing market and to stimulate economic activity. In the United Kingdom, the Bank
of England engaged in quantitative easing by purchasing UK government bonds. And
very recently, the ECB decided to conduct targeted interventions in some euro area public
and private debt securities markets to address their dysfunction. In each of these cases,
the unusual central bank interventions could potentially have been questioned if the central
banks undertaking these interventions were not seen as independent, credible and committed
to safeguarding price stability.
One lesson I draw from this experience is that the greater the independence and cred-
ibility enjoyed by a central bank in ordinary times, the greater the °exibility to engage in
unusual and forceful corrective policy measures during times of crisis. Independence and
credibility cannot be taken for granted, however, and must be continuously defended, es-
pecially in jurisdictions where the independence of the central bank is not enshrined in a
constitutional treaty. The risk that the corrective actions taken by a central bank during a
crisis become part of a short-sighted political agenda cannot be ruled out.
Another issue that has surfaced in academic debates concerns the appropriateness of
price stability as the primary objective of a central bank. The zero bound on nominal
interest rates suggests that if interest rates are already low under normal circumstances,
the scope of engineering a conventional monetary policy easing by cutting rates is limited.
In light of the recent experience, when several central banks cut short-term nominal interest
rates close to zero, it has been suggested that the price stability objective should be replaced
with the objective of aiming for a stable higher rate of in°ation, say 4 percent. This, it is
argued, would provide °exibility for greater policy easing, if needed in the future.
Such proposals to abandon price stability seem to be the unfortunate consequence of a
fundamental misconception about monetary policy. They seem to draw on the false premise
that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates poses a limit on the e®ectiveness of
monetary policy to protect against de°ation. But when policy rates are close to the zero
lower bound, they no longer su±ce as indicators of the monetary policy stance and of how
6expansionary monetary policy may be. In these circumstances, unconventional policy mea-
sures acquire an elevated role. To evaluate policy, it is important to look at the complete
policy package, accounting both for conventional and unconventional policy easing. In fact,
monetary policy can continue to engage in unconventional policy easing even without chang-
ing very short-term interest rates near the zero bound. The room for conventional easing
may be limited but the ammunition for unconventional policy easing is unlimited. A more
legitimate concern is that we have much less experience with unconventional policy-easing
measures and face greater uncertainty in calibrating their impact. But this uncertainty is
only a matter of degree. Policymakers also face considerable dynamic multiplier uncertainty
with respect to conventional policy changes.
One of the lessons that can be drawn from the experience with near-zero interest rates
over the past year or so is that, when needed, unconventional monetary policy measures
can be e®ectively deployed to engineer additional easing to prevent de°ation. With this in
mind, I see absolutely no reason to tolerate corrosive higher in°ation in order to reduce the
probability that policy rates may occasionally have to be very close to zero.
3 The Strategy of Monetary Policy
There are a number of areas of broad consensus regarding what constitutes good monetary
policy practice. Two such elements are common to the monetary policy strategy of numerous
central banks around the world today, including the ECB. The ¯rst is the usefulness of a
clear de¯nition of the central bank's price stability objective, as discussed in the previous
section. The second is a forward-looking policy orientation and the associated monitoring of
economic projections and, in particular, close attention to in°ation forecasts and in°ation
expectations. Since long and variable lags are an inherent feature of monetary policy, a
forward-looking approach is a necessary part of policy stategy.
Monitoring short-term in°ation expectations is valuable because expectations are im-
portant determinants of actual price and wage setting behaviour and thus actual in°ation
over time. Monitoring the stability of in°ation expectations is also important to gauge the
7extent to which a central bank can respond to real economic disturbances without compro-
mising its price stability mandate. When private in°ation expectations become unmoored
from the central bank's objectives, macroeconomic stabilisation can be considerably harder
to achieve. Well-anchored in°ation expectations facilitate the monetary policy response
to adverse supply shocks, thereby enabling central banks to better stabilise economic °uc-
tuations. Indeed, one lesson from the crisis is the con¯rmation of this stabilising role of
well-anchored in°ation expectations when the economy is under stress.
There is less agreement, however, about a third aspect of monetary policy strategy. This
aspect concerns the degree of policy activism that should be employed as a central bank seeks
to dampen economic °uctuations and address perceived disequilibria. We may distinguish
between two alternative views: the activist view and the stability-oriented view. The activist
view suggests that, in addition to price stability, an equally important goal of monetary
policy is to guide the economy towards attainment of its ideal \potential" level of activity.
That is, an important guide to policy is the \output gap", which measures how far GDP
deviates from its potential. In contrast to the activist view, the stability-oriented approach
could be characterised as attempting to dampen economic °uctuations by promoting stable
economic growth over time, subject to a primary focus on maintaining price stability. The
stability-oriented view more closely describes the monetary policy strategy of the ECB than
the activist view. A perennial debate in monetary economics has raged over how activist
policy should be in terms of closing output gaps. In the next two sections, I review in
greater detail some lessons that can be drawn from the experience of the ECB regarding
these two approaches.
4 Monetary Policy Activism
The activist view is motivated by the fact that the academic literature sometimes poses
the monetary policy problem as the solution to a maximisation problem with not one but
two main objectives: getting in°ation as close to its assumed target, consistent with price
stability, and getting real economic activity close to its ideal \potential" level, de¯ned as
8the equilibrium or natural level of output that is consistent with price stability.5
Let p and q denote (the logarithms of) the price level and real output, respectively, and
de¯ne the rate of in°ation ¼ ´ ¢p. Then, using \stars" to mark the ideal target values of
respective variables, we can use ¼¤ to denote the numerical de¯nition of price stability and
q¤ to denote the level of potential GDP.
The activist approach to monetary policy imparts greater symmetry on closing the
in°ation gap (¼ ¡ ¼¤) and the output gap (q ¡ q¤) than alternative approaches. Thus, to
the extent that this is feasible, activist policies prescribe that monetary policy should not
only focus on achieving its price stability objective (that is closing the in°ation gap) but
also on closing the output gap. A constraining factor to achieving both results is presented
in the form of a Phillips curve. A policy tightening can, by opening a negative gap, lead to
dampening in°ation pressures and vice versa.
There are two types of activist policies: those that rely on a simple activist policy rule
and those that claim broader optimality properties. The latter can be seen as attempting to
devise a policy plan that balances the in°ation and output gaps in the outlook, accounting
as precisely as possible for model dynamics.6;7 The alternative approach, that is relying on
an activist monetary policy rule to achieve an approximate balance, is simpler. A common
reference to the latter approach is the Taylor (1993) rule:
i = r¤ + ¼ + µ¼(¼ ¡ ¼¤) + µq(q ¡ q¤) (1)
where i is the policy rate and r¤ the natural or equilibrium rate of interest.8
5Equivalent de¯nitions may also be expressed in terms of the natural rate of employment and unem-
ployment and are robust to alternative models of the process of in°ation determination, as explained by
Modigliani and Papademos (1975) in the discussion that de¯ned the NIRU (non-in°ationary rate of unem-
ployment) concept.
6The so called \°exible" in°ation targeting approach to monetary policy is sometimes presented in this
manner by some authors. See, among others, Svensson (2002) and McCallum and Nelson (2005).
7The intellectual underpinnings of the approach relate to the optimal control approach to monetary policy
that was developed in the 1970s. This was an active area of research to which Lucas Papademos, starting
with his Ph.D. thesis, contributed considerably (Athans et al (1977), Papademos (1977, 1981), Modigliani
and Papademos (1976, 1978).
8Taylor (1999), Orphanides (2003b) and Taylor and Williams (2010) review the development and rationale
for this and related simple monetary policy rules. The speci¯cation of such simple rules for a central
bank's policy rate abstracts from the zero-lower-bound problem. As mentioned earlier, unconventional
policy measures come into play when short-term rates approach zero.
9Either approach to activism potentially su®ers from a crucial practical pitfall: the need
of accurate measurements of the level of potential output to measure the output gap, (q¡q¤).
Output gaps are notoriously di±cult to construct in real time, and without reliable estimates
these activist approaches can run into problems.9
Next, I review some illustrative evidence regarding the potential usefulness of the activist
approach drawing on the recent experience of the ECB. However, since the ECB's policy
cannot be characterised by this approach and the ECB does not even publish estimates of
the output gap for the euro area, this illustrative evidence must be based on other sources.
In what follows, I rely on the pertinent analysis presented by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) in its World Economic Outlook (WEO) publications. The WEO is useful for
two reasons: First, it presents the necessary data and analysis either in the publication
or in the associated electronic databases. And second, in the years examined, the policy
recommendations appear to have been in°uenced by readings of the output gap and, in this
sense, they have had an activist bent.
Two speci¯c episodes, when the ECB was concerned about in°ation and was in a policy
tightening mode, present interesting case studies. They correspond to the Spring 2000
WEO and the Spring 2006 WEO. On both occasions, the economy was growing at a brisk
pace, but, according to the IMF analysis at the time, had not reached its potential. These
are occasions when the di®erences between the activist and stability-oriented approaches
become easier to isolate.
In the Spring of 2000 WEO, the IMF analysis suggested that the euro area su®ered from
a signi¯cant output gap that was projected to persist into 2001. (The forecasts suggested
an output gap equal to ¡1:2 percent for 2000 and ¡0:5 percent for 2001.) This was a factor
in the assessment that in°ation prospects appeared benign and a policy recommendation
that the ECB should hold back on a rapid tightening. Speci¯cally, the IMF noted:
9This is not the only di±culty. Another related problem is associated with the need of reliable estimates
of the natural rate of interest. For expositional ease, I focus on the output gap issue here, which I consider
to be more critical in practice. See e.g. Clark and Kozicki (2005), Laubach and Williams (2003), Orphanides
and Williams (2002) and Orphanides and van Norden (2002) for additional discussions of these measurement
issues.
10\Higher energy prices will temporarily a®ect headline in°ation in the short term,
but in°ationary pressures should remain subdued due to the large output gap
(projected at about 1 1/4 percent in 2000) and increased competitive pressures
caused by the deregulation and restructuring across the area. While the ECB
needs to maintain a strong anti-in°ationary stance, and a gradual shift to a less
accommodative stance is to be expected as slack is absorbed, in°ation prospects
remain benign and it is important currently to avoid holding back the ongoing
recovery through a rapid tightening of policy" (IMF, 2000, p. 18).
A similar analysis is present in the Spring 2006 WEO, and brings us closer to the crisis.
Again, the IMF projected a signi¯cant (negative) output gap for 2006 that was seen as
persisting into 2007. Speci¯cally, the forecasts suggested a euro area output gap equal to
¡1:4 percent for 2006 and ¡1:3 percent for 2007. Indeed, the signi¯cant negative output
gap on this occasion was seen as a global phenomenon. Drawing on these estimates, the
Spring WEO noted: \Quiescent in°ation, partly because of a signi¯cant global output gap,
allowed monetary policy to be very accommodative. Now as the global output gap narrows,
monetary accommodation is being withdrawn" (IMF, 2006, p. xii). The IMF went on
to suggest that the ECB should hold back on its policy tightening: \[W]ith underlying
in°ationary pressures contained and domestic demand still fragile, there appears to be no
need to rush to normalize rates" (IMF, 2006, p. 25-26).
On both of these occasions, the ECB emphasised the risks to in°ation and continued
its tightening. In retrospect, this proved to have been the right call. Retrospective analysis
using the IMF's subsequent estimates of the output gap can be read as con¯rmation of the
ECB's policy. How is this so? Simply, the large real-time negative output gap readings for
these two years were subsequently revised away, and eventually became positive estimates
of the output gap. The annual evolution of the estimates for the output gap for 2000,
from Spring 2000 to Spring 2004, and that for the output gap for 2006, from Spring 2006
to Spring 2010, are shown in Figure 3. As can be seen, on both occasions, the real-time
estimate proved to be of the wrong sign and was revised by more than 2 percentage points
11over the subsequent four years. Such revisions are not speci¯c to the IMF estimates of
the output gap. The pattern of revisions is rather typical of other estimates as well. For
comparison, the ¯gure shows the evolution of corresponding estimates of the output gap
prepared by the European Commission (EC) each Spring.10
How much does this matter for policy? To get a sense, recall that Taylor (1999) suggested
considering 2 values for the output-gap response coe±cient in rule (1), µq = 1=2 (the classic
rule), and µq = 1 (the more activist revised rule). Thus, a 2 percentage point revision
in the output gap corresponds to a 100 basis points di®erence in the classic rule and 200
basis points in the revised rule. Considering the size of typical policy changes, these are
remarkably large.
Figure 4 plots the time series of real-time estimates of the output gap from each Spring
WEO against the latest vintage (Spring 2010). Note also that the real-time estimates appear
to be systematically biased downward. Since the birth of the euro, the real-time estimate of
the euro area output gap in the Spring WEO has been negative every single year. Looking
at the ¯rst ten years of this sample (1999 - 2008), on seven of ten occasions, the sign of the
2010 estimate of potential output is the reverse of the sign of the real-time estimate.11 The
average bias for the ¯rst ten years is quite large, around 2.1 percentage points. The pattern
of revisions is consistent with a gradual downward update of the rate of growth of potential
GDP, which characterizes various estimates over the past decade.
One reason for the pronounced di®erence between the real-time and the recent estimates
of the output gap is the dramatic revisions in prospects regarding potential GDP, partly as
a result of the recent crisis. Figure 5 traces successive vintages of the output gap, starting
with Spring 2000 to show how large the revisions were in the early years of the euro area.
Figure 6 plots the successive vintages of the output gap from 2006 to the present. As can
be seen, these estimates vary rather little for the early part of the sample shown but are
drastically di®erent for the past few years. The crisis has forced a reevaluation of the euro
10These are typically produced one month after the IMF estimates. The 2001 estimate of the 2000 gap in
the ¯gure is from the Autumn 2001 forecast, as it is missing in the Spring forecast of that year.
11Random selection would have suggested that ¯ve out of ten times the sign should be expected to be
correct.
12area's productive capacity, as it has elsewhere in the world. According to the Spring 2010
IMF analysis, the output gap of all advanced economies for 2006 and 2007 is now estimated
to have been large and positive ( +0:9 and +1:5 percent, respectively) and not signi¯cantly
negative as was projected in 2006 ( ¡0:6 and ¡0:5 percent, respectively).
Thus, the crisis has recon¯rmed the lesson that activist monetary policy cannot work,
simply because of our inability to possess reliable estimates of the output gap in real time.
All in all, the size of revisions in estimates of the output gap for the euro area, as shown in
the IMF analysis, suggests that the ECB is correct to eschew the activist approach to policy.
This lesson against activism in monetary policy is not new. It is just a recon¯rmation of
earlier similar experiences, for example the disastrous experience of the Federal Reserve
during the 1970s when warnings against the activist approach were not heeded.12
5 The Stability-Oriented View and Robust Simple Rules
It is not necessary to rely on activist guidelines to formulate e®ective monetary policy.
The alternative, stability-oriented approach appears less ambitious. Its relative strength
is in consistently preserving price stability, stressing robustness over optimality. As an
illustration, in this section I provide an example of a simple policy rule along these lines
that I have found useful to monitor, among other things, over the past several years.13
The policy rule is a simple di®erence rule that can be thought of as providing prescrip-
tions for quarterly changes of the policy rate based on the evolution of in°ation and real
GDP growth:
¢i = µ¼(¼ ¡ ¼¤) + µ¢q(¢q ¡ ¢q¤): (2)
Rules of this type have been extensively investigated in quantitative evaluations and have
been found to be robust to various sources of misspeci¯cation and to the possibility (in
reality the certainty) of imperfect knowledge on the part of policymakers and of businesses
and households in the model economies.14
12See e.g. Orphanides (2003a) and Orphanides and Williams (2005, 2010).
13This is based on a similar illustration I originally presented at The ECB and Its Watchers VIII conference
in May 2006.
14See e.g. Orphanides and Williams (2002, 2008) and the references cited therein.
13The intellectual underpinnings of this rule connect with the writings of Knut Wicksell
at the end of the 19th century and those of Milton Friedman in the middle of the 20th
century, as well as numerous other authors. The common thread is the desire to ¯nd a
simple monetary policy guide that can lead to reasonably robust policy without requiring
precise information about theoretical concepts such as the various \natural rates" (e.g. the
de¯nition of full employment or potential output, or the equilibrium real interest rate) that
cannot be reliably observed or measured when policy is set. Estimates of output gaps are
not needed for guiding policy in this approach, only a sense of the economy's trend growth,
which is subject to considerably less uncertainty.
The link to Friedman comes from the idea that a robust rule for ensuring long-term
monetary stability is for the central bank to maintain a constant rate of growth of the
money supply|Milton Friedman's k-percent rule. This is an example of a policy rule that
does not require knowledge of either the natural rate of output or the natural rate of interest,
but with a money instrument (Friedman, 1960). The Friedman rule draws on the equation
of exchange that can be expressed in growth rates (approximated with log-di®erences) as
follows:
¢m + ¢v = ¼ + ¢q (3)
where m and v are (the logarithms of) the money stock and its velocity, respectively.
Selecting the constant growth of money, k, to correspond to the sum of a desired in°ation
target, ¼¤, and the economy's potential growth rate, ¢q¤, and adjusting for any secular
trend in the velocity of money, ¢v¤, suggests a simple rule that can achieve, on average,
the desired in°ation target, ¼¤:
¢m = ¼¤ + ¢q¤ ¡ ¢v¤: (4)
Further, if the velocity of money were fairly stable, this simple rule would also yield a
high degree of economic stability. Unpredictable °uctuations in the equilibrium velocity of
money that may take time to ascertain and operational di±culties in controlling the money
supply in the short run for all but the most narrow monetary aggregates, however, do not
speak well for relying on the money supply as the main instrument for monetary policy.
14While monetary aggregates can serve to cross-check the stance of monetary policy, especially
with regard to medium-to-long term risks to in°ation, short-term nominal interest rates are
usually more suitable to serve as day-to-day policy instruments.
The simple interest rate rule (2) may be seen as relating to Friedman's k-percent rule
described above. To see the relationship between rule (2) and money growth targeting,
substitute the money growth in rule (4) into the equation of exchange so that the rule can
be stated in terms of the velocity of money:
¢v ¡ ¢v¤ = (¼ ¡ ¼¤) + (¢q ¡ ¢q¤): (5)
Consider now the simplest formulation of money demand as a (log-) linear relationship
between velocity deviations from its equilibrium and the rate of interest. In di®erence form
this is
¢v ¡ ¢v¤ = a¢i + e; (6)
where a > 0 and e summarises short-run money demand dynamics and temporary velocity
disturbances. To reformulate the k-percent money growth rule in terms of an interest rate
rule, while avoiding the short-run velocity °uctuations, e, one may substitute the remaining
part of (6) into (5). This yields rule (2) for some µ = µ¼ = µ¢q > 0.
The link to Wicksell derives from his work on interest and prices, where he argued that
price stability could be maintained in an economy if the market interest rate were always
equal to the economy's natural rate of interest, r¤. Wicksell examined how the central bank
might adjust the rate of interest to achieve price stability. Recognising that the natural
rate of interest is unavoidably an abstract concept, however, Wicksell did not advise that
the central bank ¯rst take a stand on what the natural rate is in order to formulate policy:
\This does not mean that the bank ought actually to ascertain the natural rate before
¯xing their own rates of interest. That would, of course, be impracticable, and would also
be quite unnecessary" (Wicksell, 1898 [1936], p. 189, emphasis in the original). Rather,
Wicksell pointed out that a simple method for a central bank to maintain approximate price
stability would be to follow a simple prescription adjusting its interest rate in a systematic
manner to developments in prices: \If prices rise, the rate of interest is to be raised; and
15if prices fall, the rate of interest is to be lowered; and the rate of interest is henceforth to
be maintained at its new level until a further movement in prices calls for a further change
in one direction or the other" (p. 189). In algebraic terms, Wicksell's proposal can be
interpreted as rule (2), but ignoring the response of interest rates to the di®erence between
the economy's growth from its potential, that is µ¼ > 0 and µ¢q = 0.
Implementation of rule (2) at a quarterly frequency requires summary indicators of the
quarterly evolution of in°ation and output growth, an assessment of trend or potential
output growth and, of course, a numerical de¯nition of price stability, ¼¤. Implementation
also requires the rule coe±cients which are set to µ¼ = µ¢q = 0:5 for this illustration.
Since monetary policy is forward looking, near-term forecasts are more useful summary
indicators of in°ation and output for guiding policy. For the illustration presented here, I
therefore rely on the ECB's SPF. Speci¯cally, I employ the average of the survey responses
regarding year-on-year forecasts for in°ation and output growth with horizons ending about
one year ahead from the data available when the survey is conducted. These \year-ahead"
forecasts have approximately the same horizon from quarter to quarter.
Figure 7 shows the one-year ahead in°ation forecast from the SPF together with two
numerical guides for the de¯nition of price stability to be used in the rule: an upper guide
of 2 percent and a lower guide of 1.5 percent. Comparing the in°ation forecast with the
corresponding guide, therefore, indicates whether the rule prescribes that the policy rate
should be raised or lowered on account of the near-term in°ation outlook.
Figure 8 shows the one-year ahead GDP growth forecasts from the SPF together with
two alternative indicators of what trend or potential GDP growth is. One indicator is from
the survey itself, the average response to a question asking what GDP growth is expected to
be ¯ve years ahead. Because cyclical dynamics are expected to dissipate in a few years, this
long-term forecast provides information about what the respondents view as the long-term
growth potential of the economy. The second indicator is a rough real-time estimate of
potential GDP growth based on the analysis presented in the IMF's WEO. In each year,
the ¯gure plots the potential GDP growth estimate for that year as re°ected in the Spring
16WEO. The same estimate from the Spring WEO is plotted for all four quarters of the year.
As can be seen, the WEO estimates are generally close to the ¯ve-year ahead SPF forecast.
A substantial di®erence appears for 2009 and 2010, however. The WEO estimates re°ect an
unusually large drop in potential GDP growth, not seen in the SPF forecast. According to
the WEO analysis, however, this drop is expected to be temporary: thus, the implied ¯ve-
year ahead forecast of potential output growth would be much closer to the corresponding
SPF forecast shown in the ¯gure (IMF, 2009). The comparison of the GDP forecast with
its underlying estimated trend, indicates whether the economy is expanding faster or slower
than its normal limit in the near term, and therefore signals whether the rule prescribes that
the policy rate should be raised or lowered on account of the near-term in°ation outlook.
The combination of two alternative estimates for trend GDP and the upper and lower
guide for the de¯nition of price stability results in four di®erent values for the quarterly
change in the policy rate suggested by the rule. Figure 9 compares the resulting envelope
of rule prescriptions (the shaded area in the ¯gure) with the actual quarterly change in the
ECB policy rate (more precisely, the rate on the main re¯nancing operations, MRO). For
actual policy, in each quarter I use the MRO rate following the policy meeting of the second
month of the quarter. This provides the closest match to the timetable of the SPF. As
already noted, the survey is conducted towards the end of the ¯rst month in every quarter
and the results are available to the Governing Council at the policy meeting of the second
month. Figure 10 shows the prescriptions for the level of the policy rate that emerge from
applying the prescribed quarterly changes to the level of the policy rate a quarter earlier.
As can be seen in the ¯gures, the contours of the policy prescriptions from this simple
robust rule line up reasonably well with the actual policy decisions taken by the Governing
Council of the ECB. In that sense, this rule is also descriptive of ECB policy. However,
several complications should be kept in mind in treating the resulting illustration as an
exercise in description. These complications would imply that the rule implemented as
described above may suggest distorted policy prescriptions. The complications arise from
the fact that the inputs to the rule may not coincide with either the ECB/Eurosystem sta®
17analysis or the Governing Council's views. Thus, the rule prescriptions would be tighter
than indicated if, for example: (i) the in°ation forecast were higher, (ii) the output growth
forecast were stronger, or (iii) the potential output growth were more pessimistic than
assumed in the exercise.
Even if a simple rule such as the one shown captured actual policy decisions reasonably
well most of the time, deviations would be expected, re°ecting factors that may importantly
in°uence policy on some occasions but are not captured by the simple rule. Two such
noteworthy deviations in the period since the ¯nancial turbulence began can be seen in
Figures 9 and 10.
The ¯rst deviation concerns the policy rate increase in 2008Q3, re°ecting the tightening
on 3 July 2008. According to the rule prescriptions, the evidence that the economy was
weakening would have argued against the tightening during that summer. An important
consideration at the time was a serious concern that in°ation expectations risked becoming
unmoored, a concern not adequately re°ected in the summary indicator re°ecting the near-
term deterioration in the in°ation outlook. In the summer of 2008, the euro area, together
with other parts of the world, experienced an in°ation scare. This was toward the tail end
of a long spell of increases in energy and commodity prices. For many months, despite some
signs of weakness in the economy and despite continuing tensions in ¯nancial markets, there
were successive deteriorations in the outlook for headline in°ation. Signs of the emerging
in°ation scare appeared in ¯nancial market indicators and also in survey expectations. For
example, as seen in Figure 2, the ECB's SPF showed a shift in the distribution of forecaster's
responses regarding their expectation of in°ation ¯ve years ahead. As seen in the ¯gure,
the survey that was published in August 2008 was the only one in the history of the survey
where more than a quarter of the respondents thought in°ation ¯ve-years ahead would
exceed 2 percent. The mean of the forecasts, also shown, was the highest recorded in the
history of the survey and slightly exceeded 2 percent (although the reading still rounded to
2.0). This was also the only occasion in the history of the survey when the calendar-year-
after-next as well as the two-year-ahead forecast exceeded 2 percent. (They both registered
182.1 percent.)
In the Introductory Statement released after the meeting, the Governing Council stressed
that: \Against this background, it is imperative to ensure that medium to longer-term
in°ation expectations remain ¯rmly anchored at levels in line with price stability" (ECB,
2008). On this occasion, ensuring that long-term in°ation expectations remained well-
anchored, proved to be a decisive factor.
Another deviation from the policy rule is evident during 2009. According to the policy
rule prescriptions shown in Figure 10, additional policy easing (re°ected in the reduction
of the ECB policy rate on main re¯nancing operations) would have been suggested by the
simple policy rule. The lower bound of the range even suggests that, according to the rule,
the policy rate would have been set to a negative number for a couple of quarters, if that
were possible. This episode, of course, involves near-zero short-term nominal interest rates.
As already noted, under these circumstances, the stance of monetary policy cannot be ad-
equately represented by the conventional policy changes embedded in short-term interest
rates alone. On this occasion, faced with the zero nominal interest rate bound, the Govern-
ing Council supplemented its conventional policy easing that brought the main policy rate
(MRO) to the historically low 1 percent level with unconventional policy measures, includ-
ing liquidity provision at longer maturities and the purchases of assets for monetary policy
purposes. Some of these measures were unprecedented in scale and scope. Indicatively, I
mention the decision to o®er unlimited liquidity for one year at the rate of 1 percent, upon
presentation of adequate collateral, which resulted in the unprecedented liquidity injection
of 442 billion euro in June 2009. The decisive unconventional policy measures adopted
in the ¯rst half of 2009 drove overnight interest rates considerably below the policy rate
and also in°uenced other interest rates and asset prices. A comparison of the behaviour of
overnight interest rates (eonia) as well as the three-month interbank rate (euribor) compared
to the policy rate (MRO) illustrates the point. As seen in Figure 11, for example, since the
Spring of 2009, the three-month euribor has been trading consistently substantially below
the policy rate, whereas under normal circumstances it should exceed it.
19This analysis suggests that the simple rule illustrated above can be seen as an informative
proxy of the ECB's economic analysis, aiming at assessing the role of short-run forecasts
of in°ation and economic activity on policy. In this sense, it may form a useful element in
policy discussions. However, it should not be misinterpreted as coming close to providing
the full range of considerations pertinent to any policy decisions. It should be recalled, for
example, that the ECB's two-pillar approach to policy cross-checks economic analysis with
the monetary analysis that focuses on a longer-term horizon. This two-pillar approach is
designed to ensure that no relevant information is lost in the assessment of the risks to price
stability and that appropriate attention is paid to di®erent perspectives in order to come
to an overall judgement on the risks to price stability.15
6 Activism and Asset Prices
Another area of continuing debate regarding the monetary policy strategy concerns the
treatment of suspected asset price misalignments. In light of the large costs of the recent
¯nancial crisis, the origins of which could be related to such a misalignment, a re-assessment
of the role of central banks in promoting ¯nancial stability is certainly in order. But how
activist should monetary policy be in order to counter suspected asset price misalignments?
Broadly speaking, there are two main strategies for dealing with ¯nancial imbalances
and suspected asset price bubbles. The conventional, non-activist strategy advocates that a
central bank should focus its attention on the total risks to the outlook of in°ation and real
economic activity in evaluating policy alternatives.16 Interest rate policy adjustments should
only react to suspected asset price misalignments to the extent that changes in asset prices
might a®ect prospective output and in°ation prospects over the pertinent horizon. Thus,
if a suspected bubble translates into ebullience in consumption and investment decisions, a
policy tightening responding to the demand imbalance would be in order. And if a suspected
bubble bursts, thus dampening aggregate demand, a monetary loosening would reduce the
15See Beck and Wieland (2007, 2008) for a formalisation of this cross-checking.
16Bernanke (2002), Greenspan (2010), Kohn (2006, 2009) and Posen (2009), among others, have argued
in favour of this approach.
20possible damage|the so called \mop-up" approach to treating ¯nancial bubbles.
The alternative, more activist approach to responding to suspected asset price misalign-
ments suggests that monetary policy should \lean against the wind" of emerging ¯nancial
imbalances over and above the implicit policy reaction suggested by the e®ect of the sus-
pected asset price developments on the evaluation of the risks to the outlook for in°ation
and real economic activity.17 This approach calls for \extra action" to be taken on account
of asset price movements (Kohn, 2006). The suggested rationale is that tempering emerging
¯nancial imbalances while they are developing can reduce the probability of costly ¯nancial
instability in the future.
There are a number of practical concerns that bring into question the appropriateness of
this activist approach. Even if the presence of a bubble is ascertained, one concern regards
the di±culty in calibrating the size of an \appropriate" interest rate response. Another
concern regards the appropriate direction and timing of an activist monetary response to
suspected asset price misalignments. Should policy tighten to arrest a brewing bubble or
ease in anticipation of its crash? The most obvious concern, however, is that suspected
asset price misalignments cannot be identi¯ed with enough accuracy in real time. Early
identi¯cation is intrinsically di±cult as it presupposes the ability to determine the funda-
mental value of assets when market forces fail to do so. This problem is fundamentally
similar to the di±culty in assessing real-time estimates of the output gap for stabilisation
policy. Only here the di±culty is far greater. Policymakers are asked to take a de¯nitive
position questioning the collective wisdom re°ected in market valuations.
The non-activist approach need not mean that suspected asset price misalignments are
ignored in setting interest rates, however, and if the risk evaluation framework is su±-
ciently encompassing, it may nest the concerns of the proponents of the activist view. In
particular, to the extent that a misalignment is detected, and concerns regarding the pos-
sibility of a ¯nancial collapse emerge, these concerns can and should be mapped into the
risk analysis concerning the outlook of the economy. An asset boom stokes in°ationary
17Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio and White (2003), Cecchetti et al (2002) and White (2006), among others,
have argued in favour of this approach.
21dynamics. And an asset price collapse can create the risk of a de°ationary dynamic in
the economy. These undesirable outcomes that are associated with asset price booms and
busts can be accounted for as part of the overall risk analysis for monetary policy, provided
the horizon for the analysis is su±ciently long. Indeed, as Papademos (2009c) points out,
because asset price booms are often associated with robust money and credit expansion,
accounting for the longer-term risks re°ected in the ECB's monetary analysis provides an
appropriate framework for incorporating the pertinent information in formulating policy.
Closely monitoring money and credit can alert policymakers to the potential for ¯nancing
unsustainable runs in asset prices in the medium to long-run. An advantage of the ECB
monetary policy strategy in using information from the monetary analysis pillar in this
manner, is that it can account for the risks from potential misalignments in an integrated
risk management approach, without the need to take a de¯nitive position on identifying
asset price misalignments (Issing, 2009a,b).
The pertinent tradeo® may be viewed as one regarding a comparison of the risks to
price stability over shorter horizons against tail risks at longer horizons. If an adjustment
in interest rates can reduce the tail risks to price stability associated with a suspected price
misalignment at a more distant horizon, without signi¯cantly raising risks of deviating from
price stability over nearer horizons, such an adjustment would seem warranted. That said,
the interest rate does not seem to be the most appropriate instrument for minimising the
tail risks associated with a possible asset market collapse at distant horizons. Interest rates
have always been and remain too blunt a tool for this purpose.
Enhancing ¯nancial stability is certainly a worthwhile goal. The great ¯nancial crisis
has provided a reminder of the value of longer-term risk analysis, such as re°ected in
the ECB's monetary analysis pillar. But it has not provided concrete additional evidence
that monetary policymakers should use their interest rate policy instrument to respond to
emerging ¯nancial imbalances over and above what could be justi¯ed by a thorough analysis
of the risks to price stability. Rather, regulatory tools should be brought to bear in order
to minimise the risks associated with suspected asset price misalignment. Which brings us
22to the question regarding central bank involvement in regulation and supervision.
7 Is Price Stability Enough?
The crisis has con¯rmed that a central bank with a price stability objective and insu±cient
regulatory powers cannot ensure broader ¯nancial stability in the economy. The question
is broader than that regarding the treatment of asset price misalignments and extends to
other suspected imbalances in the economy such as overextended households and businesses,
high levels of private and public debt, persistent current account de¯cits, highly leveraged
positions in ¯nance, etc.
The crisis has revealed a general underappreciation of systemic risks in micro-prudential
supervision, and highlighted the need for a more system-wide macro-prudential approach
towards supervisory oversight to ensure overall stability in the ¯nancial system. By de¯-
nition, micro-prudential supervisors focus on individual institutions and cannot e®ectively
assess the broader macroeconomic risks that pose a threat to the ¯nancial system as a
whole. This is a task best suited to central banks.
However, for central banks to better enhance ¯nancial stability they must be provided
with the right tools. In general, a central bank does not face a tradeo® between price stability
and ¯nancial stability. Rather, most of the time these two goals tend to reinforce each other.
But there may be occasions when interest rate policy directed at preserving price stability is
clearly insu±cient to reduce risks to ¯nancial stability. Consider, for example, an episode of
persistently high credit growth in an environment of price stability. Adjusting the interest
rate tool is unlikely to be the most appropriate response. Ideally, under such circumstances,
the central bank should have at its disposal macro-prudential levers with which to contain
the risk of a potential ¯nancial disturbance. These could comprise the power to vary capital
requirements, leverage ratios, loan-to-value ratios, margin requirements and so forth.
This highlights the importance of ongoing e®orts to strengthen the macro-prudential
supervision role of central banks (de Larosi¶ ere, 2009). Macro-prudential policies could aim
to contain the build up of ¯nancial imbalances and ensure that the ¯nancial system is
23su±ciently resilient to withstand a disorderly unwinding (Papademos, 2009d).
The task of the central bank in its role as macro-prudential supervisor is to identify
and assess risks and, if needed, to issue warnings and recommendations for remedial action.
An issue that remains open, however, is the degree of e®ectiveness of such warnings and
recommendations in the absence of an appropriate enforcement mechanism for heeding such
warnings. Can macro-prudential supervision succeed in preventing the accumulation of large
imbalances without the tools of enforcement? Can the macro-prudential recommendations
issued by a central bank be enforced without the intimate involvement of the central bank
in regulation and supervision pertaining to credit and ¯nance?
Prior to the crisis, there was a tendency to separate monetary policy from supervision
and regulation, though both could be viewed as central banking functions. Although, in
numerous jurisdictions, the functions of bank supervision and regulation have traditionally
been the responsibility of the central bank, in some cases these functions were separated
from the core monetary policy function of the central bank. A lesson from the crisis is
that this trend should be reversed. Indeed, some jurisdictions have already moved in that
direction.
The crisis has revealed not only the need for more e®ective micro- and macro-prudential
regulation and supervision but also the need for better coordination between the micro and
macro parts. Considering the important informational synergies between micro-prudential
supervision and systemic risk analysis, bringing micro-supervision under the same roof as
other central bank functions seems an attractive proposition. Central banks can bene¯t
from, and rely on, extended access to supervisory information and intelligence, especially
on systemically relevant intermediaries, in order to better assess risks and vulnerabilities of
the ¯nancial system as a whole. Overall, a lesson of the crisis is that greater central bank
involvement in regulation and supervision pertaining to credit and ¯nance should contribute
to better management of overall economic stability. In turn, by reducing the prospects of
tail events, this would contribute to the enhancement of price stability.
248 Concluding Remarks
Unlike the natural sciences, in central banking we do not have the luxury of running con-
trolled experiments to improve our understanding of the world. Our only guide is history.
As a result, crises are unique \natural experiments" that we can mine for information to
advance our learning. Re°ecting on lessons from the current crisis, Lucas Papademos ob-
served that not only it has been \great" and \beyond compare", but that it has also been \a
learning experience `beyond compare' for market participants and policymakers, including
central banks" (Papademos, 2009c). From the numerous ensuing lessons, I would like to
end by returning to two fundamentals that the crisis has reminded us. First, principles:
By staying true to its principles, by always being committed to preserving price stability,
a central bank can have the credibility and °exibility required to take forceful corrective
measures and serve as the cornerstone of stability during a crisis. Second, humility: We
must always strive to avoid hybris. We must avoid the temptation to overpromise on what
monetary policy can achieve and remain mindful of the limits of our knowledge.
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Notes: Year-on-year growth of euro area seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP.
30Figure 2
In°ation and Long-Term In°ation Expectations









Expected inflation, 5−years ahead
Notes: HICP shows the rate of increase of the index over 12 months. Expected in°ation is
the average ¯ve-year ahead forecast reported in the ECB SPF. The thin red lines denote
the 25% and 75% percentiles and the shaded area re°ects the interquartile range of the
cross-sectional distribution of the individual responses.
31Figure 3
Evolution of Output Gap Estimates: Two Examples
Estimate for 2000 Output Gap Estimate for 2006 Output Gap
















Notes: Evolution of IMF and European Commission (EC) estimates of the output gap for
year 2000 (left panel) and year 2006 (right panel). IMF estimates are from the Spring WEO
of each year. EC estimates are from the Spring forecast of each year, except for 2001 when
only the Autumn estimate is available.
32Figure 4
Real-time vs Retrospective Output Gap Estimates












Notes: The Spring 2010 series shows the historical output gap estimates from the latest
IMF WEO (Spring 2010). The real-time series shows, in each year, the output gap estimate
from the IMF Spring WEO of that year.
33Figure 5
Evolution of History of the Output Gap from 2000 on














Notes: Each line shows IMF output gap estimates from the corresponding Spring WEO.
34Figure 6
Evolution of History of the Output Gap from 2006 on












Notes: Each line shows IMF output gap estimates from the corresponding Spring WEO.
35Figure 7
Outlook for In°ation








Notes: Expected in°ation, one-year ahead, is the average response in the ECB SPF.
36Figure 8
Outlook for GDP Growth









Expected GDP growth, 1−year ahead
Expected GDP growth, 5−years ahead
Potential GDP estimate (IMF, Spring WEO)
Notes: Expected growth one-year ahead and ¯ve-years ahead are the average responses in
the ECB SPF. Potential output growth in each year re°ects the real-time estimate from
that year's IMF Spring WEO.
37Figure 9
Policy Rate and Simple Rule Prescription: Quarterly Change






Notes: The shaded area represents the envelope of prescriptions from the simple policy rule:
¢i = 1
2(¼ ¡¼¤)+ 1
2(¢q ¡¢q¤). (¼ ¡¼¤) re°ects the deviations in the SPF one-year ahead
in°ation forecasts from either of two bounds as shown in Figure 7. (¢q ¡ ¢q¤) re°ects
the deviations in the SPF one-year ahead GDP growth forecasts from either of two trend
measures as shown in Figure 8. The solid line shows the quarterly change in the ECB policy
rate (MRO) following the policy meeting of the 2nd month in each quarter.
38Figure 10
Policy Rate and Simple Rule Prescription









Notes: The shaded area represents the envelope of prescriptions from the simple policy rule:
¢i = 1
2(¼ ¡ ¼¤) + 1
2(¢q ¡ ¢q¤), that emerge from applying the prescribed change to the
level of the policy rate a quarter earlier. (¼¡¼¤) re°ects the deviations in the SPF one-year
ahead in°ation forecasts from either of two bounds as shown in Figure 7. (¢q¡¢q¤) re°ects
the deviations in the SPF one-year ahead GDP growth forecasts from either of two trend
measures as shown in Figure 8. The solid line shows the ECB policy rate (MRO) following
the policy meeting of the 2nd month in each quarter.
39Figure 11
Money Market and ECB Policy Interest Rates














Notes: Eonia is the 5-day trailing moving average.
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